Continuous monitoring
The principle
An SBOM is only valuable when replayed continuously. A component that is clean today is vulnerable tomorrow, with no new build having taken place. That is the difference between a CI check and a compliance arrangement.
It is also why centralisation is mandatory: you do not re-evaluate thousands of files scattered across artefact registries every day.
The architecture
Archived SBOMs (every shipped version)
│
▼
Steering platform ──── daily re-evaluation ────────┐
▲ │
│ ▼
Vulnerability sources Targeted alerts
EUVD · OSV · NVD · vendor advisories │
confirmed-exploitation catalogues ▼
upstream project advisories Team owning the product
│
▼
Triage → VEX → fix
The key word is targeted: the platform alerts only the teams whose products actually contain the component, in an affected version. Broadcasting produces noise and kills attention.
Sources and their use
| Source | Frequency | Use |
|---|---|---|
| EUVD — European vulnerability database, operated by ENISA | Daily | European reference, to be preferred in your reporting |
| OSV | Daily | purl correlation, high precision on packages |
| NVD | Daily | Broad coverage, to be filtered to avoid CPE false positives |
| Confirmed-exploitation catalogues | Daily | Prioritisation trigger, strong indicator for qualification |
| Vendor and distribution advisories | Daily | Avoids false positives caused by backports |
| Upstream project advisories | By subscription | Often ahead of public databases |
EUVD and the reporting platform
Two distinct European arrangements, often confused:
| EUVD | Single reporting platform (SRP) | |
|---|---|---|
| Nature | A vulnerability database | A reporting channel |
| Origin | Created under NIS 2, operated by ENISA | Created by the CRA, operated by ENISA |
| Direction of flow | You consume it | You submit to it |
| Use | Continuous monitoring | 24 h early warning, 72 h notification, final report |
The link between them: after processing by the coordinating CSIRT and ENISA, your reports feed the European vulnerability knowledge ecosystem — of which the EUVD is the shop window. That is what “feeding the EUVD through the reporting platform” means.
Monitoring upstream
Distinct from vulnerability monitoring, and just as necessary:
- subscribing to security advisories of the projects you depend on critically;
- tracking activity: date of last commit, release frequency, number of active maintainers;
- detecting abandoned projects, and triggering the strategy decided in Integrating open source;
- alerting on maintainer or licence changes — both are risk signals, one security, one legal.
This monitoring covers a limited set of components: those critical to your products. Attempting to watch the entire transitive graph produces unusable noise.
What must be automatic
| Automatic | Manual |
|---|---|
| Daily re-evaluation of the estate | Exploitability analysis |
| SBOM / source correlation | Drafting the VEX |
| Routing the alert to the owning team | Priority arbitration in case of conflict |
| Opening a ticket with the context | Reporting decision |
| SLA deadline reminders | Customer communication |
| Detecting a component reaching end of maintenance | Choosing the replacement strategy |
The principle: the machine finds and routes, the human decides. Anything left to human initiative in the left-hand column eventually stops happening.
Metrics
- Detection interval: time between a vulnerability being published and your alert.
- Triage interval: time between alert and handling decision.
- Remediation interval by severity level.
- Coverage: share of shipped products whose SBOM is actually monitored.
- Average age of open vulnerabilities.
- Ratio of actionable alerts to raw alerts — see False positives.
Coverage is the first to look at: monitoring 40 % of the portfolio perfectly is not a compliance arrangement, it is a pilot.